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ABSTRACT
Peer-to-peer systems are known to be vulnerable to the Sybil attack. The lack
of a central authority allows a malicious user to create many fake identities (called
Sybil nodes) pretending to be independent honest nodes. The goal of the malicious
user is to influence the system on his/her behalf. In order to detect the Sybil nodes
and prevent the attack, a reputation system is used for the nodes, built through
observing its interactions with its peers. The construction makes every node a part
of a distributed authority that keeps records on the reputation and behavior of the
nodes. Records of interactions between nodes are broadcast by the interacting nodes
and honest reporting proves to be a Nash Equilibrium for correct (non-Sybil) nodes.
In this research is argued that in realistic communication schedule scenarios, simple
graph-theoretic queries such as the computation of Strongly Connected Components
and Densest Subgraphs, help in exposing those nodes most likely to be Sybil, which
are then proved to be Sybil or not through a direct test executed by some peers.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
In a large distributed network system, many types of security threats arise. A number
of these are due to weaknesses in cryptographic protocols and concern the detection
of malicious users trying to access data they do not have the rights to access, or
forging another user’s identity. Unlike those problems, Sybil attack is closely linked
to the level of anonymity allowed by the system. Many security mechanisms, voting
and recommendation systems base their protocols on the assumption of a one-to-one
correspondence between entities and identities. If this basic assumption is broken,
those systems are compromised. Sybil attack denotes the creation of many (fake)
identities by a single entity in a distributed system, for the purpose of influencing
and disrupting the normal behavior of the system.
1.1.1 Existing work
Sybil attack was first named and studied by Douceur [10]. Douceur used the “com-
munication cloud” model of communication, where a node “submits” a (possibly
encrypted) message into the cloud, and any node capable of reading the message
may do so by simply “plucking it out” of the cloud and decrypting it if necessary.
The point of stating the model this way was not so much the broadcast nature of it,
but the fact that the origin of a message may only be determined from the message
contents, and not from any network-provided information on the message (headers,
or the actual host/router from which the message was received). In other words, the
identity of a message sender cannot be determined from any external information
about the message, only from the message contents. Douceur proved that Sybil
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attack cannot be prevented in such a model, and its severity only depends on the
computational power of the malicious user relative to the computational power of
honest users. Basically, as long as there is no centralized authority that would cer-
tify identities of users accepted into the network, the number of identities an entity
may create is only limited by the amount of work the entity puts into this activity.
(The removal of typical communication infrastructure from the model may also be
motivated by thinking of this infrastructure as equivalent to a centralized identity-
verification authority). Since the paper of Douceur [10], many others papers have
been published on various forms of the Sybil attack problem [14] [18] [20] [2] [4] [5]
[23] [22] [12].
Newsome et al. [14] studied the problem in the context of sensor networks and
their methods were designed to work with the specific properties of radio resources,
for example, they assumed that a node may not listen simultaneously on more than
one frequency. Sastry et al. [18] presented an early version of a protocol that verifies
node locations and bases node identities on their location information. Similar ideas
were also proposed by Waters and Felten [20], Bazzi and Konjevod [2] and Cˇapkun
and Hubaux [4, 5]. In the most general form, these works are based on measuring
the delays incurred by communications between nodes and imposing a geometric
structure on the “distance space” to determine node locations. In particular, Bazzi
and Konjevod show that, assuming the triangle inequality and a geometry close
to Euclidean, even in the presence of colluding malicious users, one can design
distributed protocols to localize nodes and thus help prevent Sybil attack. The
common fundamental assumption here is that each real entity has the additional
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property of physical location within the distributed system, and that this property
will influence the communication by the entity sufficiently that a powerful enough
observer may distinguish it from the communication by any other entity. (Even if it
is not always the case that every pair of entities may be distinguished, if the groups
of indistinguishable entities are small enough, most of the repercussions of a Sybil
attack may be prevented.)
The disadvantage of relying on the geometry of roundtrip delays is that it
applies only to systems with honest routers. Also, due to the variability of network
load and delays it is not always possible to have accurate measurements of roundtrip
delays and clock synchronizations between routers that can be far apart physically.
Another inconvenience is when a malicious user controls several network locations.
In such condition the attacker can fabricate arbitrary network coordinates between
those locations, thus breaking the proposed security system. Furthermore, this
system would not work at all in a dynamic network. On the other hand, this work
does describe remotely issued certificates that can be used to test the distinctness
of identities, and that idea may be of use combined with some facets of our approach.
More recently, Yu et al. [23, 22] gave protocols that rely on a different
restriction: they assume the existence of “secure” links between, say, pairs of
friends in the network. Thus, any message coming directly through such a link
comes with a known origin. In other words, one recognizes that the message was
sent by a good friend (although, if the message is only relayed by the friend, no
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more is known about its origin). This may be seen as a step towards allowing
centralized infrastructure, but the local nature of the edges encourages us to
think about them as “local authorities”. In order to “set up” these edges, Yu
et al. assume prior “out-of-band” communication. They also assume that the
network formed by these edges is fast-mixing, which they claim to be the case for
most social networks. Finally, they notice a different type of restriction that is
naturally present at Sybil nodes. Since a malicious node that creates many Sybil
identities is only one node, not only is its computational power limited, but so
is its bandwidth. In short, Yu et al. require a node applying for acceptance to
the system to send a message that performs an “almost random” walk. The node
receiving the application (“the verifier”) does the same. Then, if two messages
cross paths, the node is accepted. The idea behind their argument is that Sybil re-
gions are bandwidth-limited and a message sent from within one will rarely “escape”.
In both SybilGuard [23] and SybilLimit [22], the protocol is based on the “social
network” among user identities, where an edge between two identities indicates an
established trust relationship between two humans. The edge key distribution is
done out-of-band which is a disadvantage in most cases. The protocols will not
work if the adversary compromises a large fraction of the nodes in the system.
An assumption on which both SybilGuard and SybilLimit rely is that malicious
users may create many nodes but relatively few attack edges. This is partially true
since these protocols are more effective in defending against malicious users than
in defending against compromised honest users that already belong to the system.
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This is because a malicious user must make real friends in order to increase the
number of attack edges, while compromised honest users already have friends. These
protocols also break the anonymity of users, which is impractical in most cases since
anonymity for many peer-to-peer users is a high priority. Taking away anonymity
will prevent many users from participation.
Lesniewski-Laas [12] assumes a one hop distributed hash table which uses the
social links between users to resist the Sybil attack. As in the case of SybilGuard and
SybilLimit, he bases his protocols in human established trust relationships breaking
the anonymity of users. This is similarly difficult to apply to real-life networks
since many users in peer-to-peer systems prioritize anonymity as a condition of
participation. Furthermore, a one-hop distributed hash table (DHT) is not a realistic
approach for the World Wide Web. Users may be many hops apart, breaking the
assumptions of the protocol proposed by Lesniewski-Laas [12].
Piro et al. [16] study Sybil attack in mobile ad-hoc networks, and propose some
protocols we find interesting. The simple observation made by them (that we are
not aware of having appeared in the literature before) is that Sybil nodes are tied
to their “maker”, and that this has special consequences in a mobile network. That
is, identities from a Sybil group that was constructed by a single malicious user
will never appear simultaneously in different regions of the network. So, if nodes
have limited capabilities of observation and if two nodes who know they are far
apart observe two identities roughly simultaneously, then these two identities are
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certainly not part of the same Sybil group. On the flip side, if two identities are
always seen together over a long period of time, then there should be a reason for
that. Unless they are linked by some other mechanism, they are very likely Sybil
identities. Remarkably, this intuition, while it appears key in the mobile setting, is
of little use in the static case. Thus, it forms a complement to the location-and-delay
based certification mechanisms of Bazzi and Konjevod [2] which were limited to the
static setting. In fact, the basic observation that a pair of independent users of a
mobile ad-hoc network will frequently be seen simultaneously in different locations
in the network, while a Sybil node is never seen far from its “master”, forms the
foundation for this research as well. However, we believe our approach is simpler and
at the same time requires fewer additional assumptions.
Piro et al. [16] also propose monitoring of the network traffic and the collisions
at the MAC level. The limitation in this case is that this only works for mobile ad
hoc networks. Others [1] propose resource testing to discourage rather than prevent
Sybil attacks.
1.1.2 Discussion
What all of these existing approaches have in common is that they restrict the origi-
nal problem formulation by making assumptions that allow the distributed system to
enforce stronger limitations on the creation of fake identities. Usually, these assump-
tions are justified by arguments about physical properties of any real peer-to-peer
network that restrict the communication cloud model by requiring some form of cost
to be associated with each interaction between peers, either time taken by a message
to reach its recipient(s), or bandwidth required for the message, or cost paid by an
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entity to have the message processed. This observation motivates our work by in-
dicating that a distributed mechanism (in which all correct nodes participate) that
imposes a certain type of cost on each communication step may in fact sufficiently
emulate the implications of the existence of a centralized authority that Sybil attack
becomes much harder in the system that employs such a mechanism.
1.2 Background
It is relevant to explain here some of the terms used in this thesis for the best
assimilation of Chapter 4.
1.2.1 Strictly proper scoring rule
A scoring rule or scoring function is used in decision theory to know the efficiency
of decision takers under conditions of uncertainty. It is called “proper” when it has
been optimized for some set of conditions, and it is called “strictly proper” if it has
been uniquely maximized for a very specific case [11][13].
1.2.2 Strict Nash equilibrium
Nash equilibrium is a term used in game theory to define a set of rules to specify an
equilibrium between two or more players competing against them, considering that
every player know the equilibrium strategies of the others, and no one can improve
the gain doing unilateral changes in its strategy.
In general, it is said that a strict Nash equilibrium is present when the strategy used
by every player is the best, given the strategies used by its peers. In other words, no
other combination of strategies between the players can improve the gains [13][15].
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1.2.3 Stochastically relevant
Let X and Y be two random variables. It is said that X is stochastically relevant for
Y only if the distribution of Y conditional on X is not equal for different realizations
of X; i.e. Pr(y|x) 6= Pr(y|x′) where x and x′ are different realizations of X, and y
is a realization of Y . In the context of probability and statistics, a realization is the
value observed in a random variable under certain conditions [13][21].
1.2.4 Strongly connected component
When there is a path from any node to any other node in a directed graph (or
subgraph), it is said that the nodes in such graph (or subgraph) are forming a strongly
connected component [9].
1.2.5 Clique
When there is an edge between any two nodes in an undirected graph (or subgraph),
it is said that the nodes in such graph (or subgraph) are forming a clique [9]. The
clique problem (finding a clique in a graph) is NP-Complete. An efficient way to
find them is looking for densest subgraphs. An algorithm for that is proposed by
Charikar [7].
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CHAPTER 2
MODEL AND BASIC OBSERVATIONS
2.1 Model and assumptions
In most of this research is assumed an abstract theoretical network model where the
nodes are in a fully connected topology and the signal of the mobile nodes reach
all their peers. This can be considered in a more abstract way as a local network
topology.
However, the topology of the network ends up being mostly abstracted away
by the communication cloud assumption mentioned earlier: we assume that each
message sent by any node is broadcast into the communication cloud, and the only
information about the origin of a message a node observes in the communication
cloud, (or equivalently, hears by listening) is contained within the contents of the
message. For example, a node cannot tell the source, or even a single network router
from which the message comes from a header, or by examining the message without
reading its contents. Thus, a message may be signed by a node, but the identity
claimed by the signing node cannot be verified directly unless we already know that
node. This assumption is used instead of any specific other about the geometry
(a metric, in particular Euclidean space, was the key to the design of Sybil attack
detection protocols in [2]) or the topology (a fast-mixing network was crucial to
the protocols in [23, 22]). In other words, The physical positions of the nodes are
irrelevant for our algorithm from the local network point of view. On the other
hand, we do assume standard cryptographic protocols such as digital signatures and
public-key cryptography work.
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Note that, similar to [2], an assumption is made that identifies a property of
a Sybil attacker and its collection of fake identities that, to an observer capable of
surveying all the events in the network, would make it obvious that is something
strange going on there. In the static setting of [2], the observer would notice many
identities at the exact same physical location in the network. In our current dynamic
setting, the image would be even more blatant: the Sybil nodes will appear in-
terconnected in a densest subgraph or in a strongly connected component, or in both.
However, we avoid specific details beyond this general assumption. We are more
interested in the fundamental consequences of anonymity in distributed systems and
in the fundamental obstacles to secure identity management than in special cases,
and so our goal is to study what can be achieved with a minimum set of assumptions
rather than to provide a complete practically working solution for a very specific
existing real world system.
The basic observation made in [16], that two or more identities belonging to the
same malicious user are connected to their master, is instrumental in our work as
well, although we use it in a fundamentally simpler way. Few variants of the more
general problem that were left open until now, are also addressed here, where a
Sybil attacker attempts to thwart the detection process, and uses different subsets of
its identities at different times, or even exchanges its identities with another attacker.
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2.2 General observations
We begin by noting that Sybil nodes by themselves may not be bad, but the major
reason to create them in the first place is to affect the system at some point in time.
All those nodes under the control of an individual can be used to negatively affect
the system. For example, they can change the outcome of a ballot or influence
the reputation of others. On the other hand, when a Sybil node is not actively
used, it doesn’t really change the system behavior, and so its bare existence is not
necessarily a threat.
Let us analyze here the basic assumptions made in the work of Piro et al. [16]
in order to clarify the differences and analogies with our work. They consider
the network as evolving over a period of time, and, for simplicity, they divide the
timeline into discrete intervals. Then, the role of network “observers” is assigned to
a set of nodes. An observer simply keeps track of nodes it sees in its vicinity over
a sequence of time intervals. Aggregating the data from multiple observers, can be
listed, for every time interval, the nodes observed in various parts of the system.
Since the range of a message is limited, observers that are far away from each
other will observe disjoint subsets of nodes during any given time interval. Thus they
notice and claim the basic fact that underlies their approach: two identities observed
during a single time interval by observers that are far away from each other, belong
to two independent entities. In other words, if an entity and any of its Sybil nodes
are observed simultaneously, they will be observed in regions of the system that are
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close-by. This approach made by Piro et al. [16] is very specific for mobile ad hoc
networks.
These are the conclusions that may be attempted by (a group of) observers in
that model.
1. Node A is observed by o1 and node B by o2 during the same time interval. The
observers o1 and o2 are far away from each other.
In this situation, it is immediately clear that A and B are identities that belong
to distinct entities, since a single entity could not be visible simultaneously in
several network locations. This event implies that A and B are distinguishable
entities, and the distributed system should in the future be able to rely on this
knowledge.
2. Node A is observed simultaneously with node B by observer o1.
Not so much can be concluded from a single such observation. On the other
hand, it may be reasonable to assume that distinct entities will in fact not
constantly move together and be located near each other. If this is true, then
each time two nodes are observed together, the likelihood that they are not
independent, and that one is a fake identity created by the other, becomes
higher.
3. Node A is observed during a time period when node B is not seen anywhere.
As in the previous case, nothing can be concluded with certainty about those
two nodes from a single observation. The two nodes may be independent, but
this event may also be a consequence of a malicious node trying to hide its tracks
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by selectively activating subsets of nodes it controls. If one could assume that
distinct entities operate so that the periods in which the entities in a subset are
active are not highly correlated, or are even statistically independent, then the
laws of probability would indicate that two identities such that, at any given
time, at most one is seen anywhere, most likely are two identities associated
with the same entity, and so that at least one of them is a Sybil identity.
However, in some cases, this situation is not as severe: since at most one
of the two identities is seen at any given moment, even if one or both are
fake identities, the damage to the distributed system is likely not very large.
Depending on the actual purpose of the distributed system, this situation may
not be of grave concern.
In a similar way, we use the basic assumptions made by Piro et al. [16] but in
a quite different approach. We do not follow the physical positions of the nodes
through the local network. Instead of physical positions we keep track of the timing
and contents of the reports broadcast by the nodes. With that information we can
infer different relations among the nodes. The weaknesses of the malicious users
and their Sybil nodes will be magnified as the time passes and more information is
gathered about their behavior. Once enough information is collected in the matrices
described in Section 4.4, the Sybil relations can be detected as densest subgraphs or
strongly connected components.
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2.3 System Model
Our system consists of a set A of k honest nodes, of a set B of m authority nodes
and a set C of n Sybil nodes. The set B is equal to A (in some cases B could be just
a subset of A). The set A ∪ B ∪ C is the set of participants. In some problems, we
assume the participants are points in either the standard d-dimensional Euclidean
space Rd or the d-dimensional unit sphere Sd. In making statements that hold for
both Rd and Sd, we refer to the space as X. We also assume that some participants
are mobile and that others have fixed positions. The distance between the nodes x
and y in X is denoted by ρ and that distance might change over time if at least one
of those nodes is mobile. We analyze the behavior of the nodes in X by dividing
the time into slots and we consider all the nodes as static for any particular slot. In
our system model we also assume a synchronized clock for all the network. In real
systems this could be the Unix time proposed by Ritchie and Thompson [17].
Ideally all the honest nodes are authority nodes (or observers) and they are
constantly listening the network for information signals (reports) to fill out their own
matrices. Theoretically in our model all the honest nodes have the same information
in their matrices, so all of them will end up finding the same densest subgraphs
and strongly connected components. In order to avoid flooding the network with so
many broadcasting, just some nodes can be set as authorities. Such selection can be
done based on the reputation and antiquity of the nodes (the lower indexes indicate
more antiquity). Any node detected or suspected of being Sybil cannot be trusted
as authority node and has to be substituted by another.
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In the event that only few nodes are set as authorities, they have to maintain an
information pool accessible to all. In the case of several local networks interconnected,
some issues arise. The information in the matrices could not be homogeneous for all
the nodes and the results will mismatch. In this case, the authority nodes of different
local networks will work more like the observer nodes proposed by Piro et al. [16].
15
CHAPTER 3
GOALS AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
To summarize our discussion so far, given in the previous Chapters, here is a list of
desirable properties for an approach to the Sybil attack problem that would improve
on the current state of knowledge.
3.1 The anonymity issue
An issue is the anonymity of users (which is endangered in the presence of a central
certificate authority) versus their safety against Sybil attacks.
It is not always possible to use certificate authorities to guarantee that each per-
son has only one identity. Good certifying agencies are expensive and may discourage
the participation of many users. In other cases, the users would prioritize anonymity,
for example in forums about religion, sex, politics, family violence, etc.
In other words, we need a self-policing peer-to-peer system that allows users to keep
their anonymity.
3.2 Static and dynamic settings
Existing solutions against Sybil attack work in special network models. Furthermore,
each of them assumes either a completely static or a very dynamic topology.
The other issue here is that in the real world the users are a mixture of mobile
and static nodes. So far, the proposed approaches work only exclusively in static
or mobile networks, but not in both. There is a lack of an algorithm that works to
validate static and mobile users as well. In the absence of a certifying authority, the
rules and policies used have to be defined and enforced by the peers themselves. Our
solution works in mobile and static nodes, or in a mixture of them as well.
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3.3 Dealing with multiple Sybil groups
The existence of multiple malicious users is a major unsolved problem related to
Sybil attack. By unsolved, we mean here that practically no proposed approach to
dealing with Sybil attack offers any relief in the situation where several malicious
users create independent Sybil groups, even if they act independently and do not
collude to make each other’s behavior more difficult to detect.
We argue that our solution works well even in the presence of multiple malicious
users, as long as they are not colluding. With several, or many attackers working
as a team handling together the same group of Sybil nodes, they can camouflage
even more the Sybil nodes making them appear “more normal” in their behavior and
making their detection harder.
3.4 Distinguishability errors
How can a protocol based on the ideas described in Section 2.2 fail? The main
action performed is to conclude that two identities are distinguishable when they
are reported to be present in two different locations simultaneously. Now, suppose
two identities A and B are pronounced distinguishable when they are in fact two
Sybil identities controlled by the same entity. First, the mode in which nodes of
the network lie is not such that nodes simply lie about having seen one of the two
identities. If the reports about having seen A and B really do come from two regions
of the network that are sufficiently far away, then the nodes reporting this cannot
be controlled by a single entity.
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In fact, thus we see that if A and B are falsely pronounced distinguishable, then
some node participating in this must be lying about its location in the network: only
if a node claims to be farther away from its Sybil siblings, can its claim of having
seen A at the same time as the rest of the nodes saw B be taken as evidence of
distinguishability for A and B. Suppose X claims to have seen A and Y to have seen
B, while X and Y were far away from each other. Now, either X or Y is lying about
its own location. Since the Sybil siblings of X and Y are restricted to one of the two
locations, say the location of X, we may conclude that Y ’s lie will be exposed as
soon as one consults any node who really was where Y claims to have been at the time.
If we refer to an error such as described above as a false positive (two identities
falsely distinguished), what about a false negative? This means two identities are
never pronounced distinguishable while they are actually two separate entities. As
argued above, except for special circumstances, this should be a very rare event.
Piro et al. [16] suggest that one may detect this by examining the amount of traffic
within such a group of mutually indistinguishable nodes.
Namely, the amount of traffic should be proportional to the square of the number
of nodes in the group if these are distinct entities, while it will be much smaller (linear
in this number) in a Sybil group: whenever Sybil node A communicates with Sybil
node B, the Sybil master is the one actually working the communication channel on
both ends.
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3.4.1 Collusion among Sybil groups
We have argued that a false positive is not easy to achieve for a single malicious
adversary. However, if two entities controlling Sybil groups collude, the detection
problem becomes more difficult. Consider two nodes A and B, each controlling a
Sybil group. In order to help A cheat and pass off its Sybil nodes a1 and a2 as
distinguishable, B (located sufficiently far away from A) claims (through any of its
Sybil nodes) to have seen a2 at the same time that A claims (through any of its
Sybil nodes) to have seen a1. Now, if there are no honest nodes located close enough
to B’s position to be able to observe a2 where B claims to have seen it, there is not
much that can be done. However, if there are, there will be a discrepancy between
their reports and those of B.
In this situation, in fact, it appears that one must require that there are more
honest nodes than the Sybil nodes controlled by B in the area where they would
observe a2. Then when it comes to examining their reports on observed nodes, more
nodes will vote not to have seen a2 than to have seen it, and the system will correctly
conclude that a2 could not have been in the area.
3.4.2 Formal observers
Having sketched out the generalities, we describe more precisely a possible approach
to more precise implementation of the ideas. As in some other proposed strategies to
defeat Sybil attack, one could maintain a set of nodes formally authorized to work
as a group and issue credentials for accessing the network. Of course, there will be a
need to enforce the correctness of their behavior, for example, to prevent them from
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defection and sudden turn to working with a Sybil group. This can be achieved, for
example, by duplicating the system and thus reducing the chance of corruption.
But let us describe the role of these “observers”. They are relatively static in
the network and they relinquish their roles when they move, handing off to new
members of the group. They cover all the regions of the network and maintain a
connected overlay that has members close enough to “every corner” so they can
observe and confirm any claimed location of a node in the network. They may work
similarly to “beacons” in [2], establishing protocols by which new applicants to
the network and those who have just moved are issued and reissued access credentials.
A few corrupt observers will not break the system in general, but strategically
selected ones may cause some serious damage and so we envision these nodes as
running distributed protocols resilient to failure of a small subset of nodes.
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CHAPTER 4
THE ALGORITHM
4.1 Overview
Our basic solution has two major components: a reputation system based on the
outcomes of interactions between peers in the network, and a separate analysis of
interactions according to their participants’ locations in time and space.
We consider the Sybil nodes as being under the control of an adversary which
may be one or more malicious users, colluding or not. Honest nodes participate in
the system to provide and receive service as peers. Honest nodes need a mechanism
to detect Sybil nodes and protect themselves against the Sybil attack. Ideally, the
mechanism of detection should be efficient enough to detect the Sybil nodes before
they gain enough reputation as trustable. The nodes are not restricted in any way
to participate in P2P operations and they can build a reputation over time that
will make them trustable. The nodes earn reputation points using a game-theoretic
mechanism. In our approach, after interacting with a peer, each node must (locally)
broadcast a report on the outcome of such interaction. Any nearby authority nodes
are always listening for those reports and collecting information on the fly. Such
information is later used to infer Sybil relations between nodes. Part of this research
has been published at the LNCS [6].
At a high level, every interaction between two nodes results in summary reports
of the interaction made by both participants. These reports contribute to reputation
scores, but they are also used to create a graph (where the edges link nodes who
are rating other nodes) whose connectivity structure is analyzed. Since a pair of
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reports is created solely by the pair of nodes reporting on their interaction, two
Sybil nodes might falsify a large number of reports in order to boost each other’s
reputation. However, if overused, this will become obvious through an analysis of
the rating graph. The third mechanism we use to detect Sybil candidates is based
on the observation that independent nodes tend to behave independently, both in
terms of where they are located, and in terms of when they communicate.
It is worth noticing here that we never restrict in any way a node from
participating and interacting with its peers (unlike some earlier systems where a
node would have to be certified before it was admitted to the network). We consider
each node honest until proven otherwise; however, if a node does not have enough
reputation points, it will not be considered very trustworthy and subsequently it
will not be able to cause much damage.
When the interaction between any two peers is over, both nodes perform a
(local) broadcast of their reports on that interaction. These two reports must match,
otherwise those nodes are marked as suspicious. From the reports that have been
broadcast and their timing, every node over time builds three data sets as explained
in Section 4.4. There is always the possibility of pairs of Sybil nodes simulating an
interaction and broadcasting false reports, in order to increase their reputations as
trustworthy nodes. It is possible they may do this infrequently, however if this is
abused, they will expose themselves since after a large number of “interactions” such
as these, there will be enough information to explore the graph induced by such
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interactions and identify active Sybil groups as its Strongly Connected Components.
For details, see Section 4.6.
Furthermore, from the timing of the report broadcasts we can learn useful in-
formation as well. For this we discretize time into slots or time buckets that we use
as observation periods. Just after an interaction between any two peers is finished,
they have to broadcast their reports with the results of such interaction. Several or
many pairs of nodes might be broadcasting their information within the same time
bucket. Analyzing this information, we can identify nodes that are more likely to be
cheating as they will appear as Densest Subgraphs of a different graph. In this part,
we take advantage of the fact that a group of Sybil nodes are under the control of
a single malicious user, which limits the capacity of the Sybil nodes to all broadcast
simultaneously.
4.2 Temporal Coincidences
Our first observation here is that if two nodes never broadcast within the same bucket,
then it is very unlikely they are independent. Indeed, if we model the communication
pattern of a node by a stochastic process, then the probability of two independent
nodes behaving in a coordinated fashion for a long period of time will naturally tend
to zero.
To be more specific, consider a family of stochastic processes that describe
the behavior of nodes in the peer-to-peer network. Suppose each independent
node randomly decides whether to interact with another node in each time step.
Suppose the probability of each node’s participation in a time step is lower-bounded
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by a positive constant ǫ. Then the probability that two nodes never or rarely
both broadcast in the same time step tends to 0 as time passes. This observation
may be used by observers collecting broadcast interaction report data to find
likely groups of nodes whose behavior is correlated. Since the particular type of
correlation mentioned here is simultaneous broadcast, and each broadcast consumes
considerable bandwidth resources, it seems reasonable to assume that Sybil groups
will have overall relatively low coincidence of broadcast reports.
Nevertheless, there is the possibility that some non-Sybil nodes show strong
correlation in their behavior. Because of this they may appear related and become
Sybil suspects. In order to differentiate regular nodes from Sybil nodes, we run a set
of tests on them. So as to avoid saturating the suspected nodes with tests coming
from many other peers (which would cause false positives), some nodes are chosen
randomly from the set of nonsuspicious nodes, asked to run the tests on the suspected
peers, and to inform the others about the results. The suspected nodes must answer
the tests within a short timeframe. If the nodes are independent, they will reply
simultaneously or close to it. There may even be many collisions on the replies if the
nodes are in fact independent. On the other hand, the replies from Sybil nodes will
be more sequential and most of them will arrive outside of the timeframe.
4.3 Game Theory and the Reputation System
Incentives and keeping a record of the behavior of peers provide a method to promote
healthy systems and cooperation [3]. This is widely used in online shopping, by
Amazon and eBay among others. Problems arise in systems where there is no central
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authority. Such systems are open to Sybil attack. In our model every node keeps
track of his/her peers’ reputations. When two peers interact they earn or lose points
based on whether they follow the rules for their interaction. Every node reports its
good and bad points earned as well as the points of the peer it has interacted with.
After two nodes finish an interaction they have to submit (broadcast) a report
independently. These reports contain the reputation points earned by them, the
node IDs, the time they started and finished the interaction and a key (for example,
containing a digital signature of each of the two nodes that cannot be forged by
other nodes). The reports are sent individually, so the key may be used to establish
a correspondence. The two reports must match. The total of reputation points earned
after an interaction session could be different for each node (asymmetric). This is
because an interacting pair of nodes do not necessarily cooperate (C) or defect (D)
in synchrony.
We assume that all interactions between two peers follows the payout rules
indicated in Table 1, where “C” states for cooperation and “D” for defection.
C D
C (1,1) (2,-3)
D (-3,2) (0,0)
TABLE 1. Payout Rules
Each peer in the network maintains a copy of the reputation matrix. Once a peer
receives both reports, as long as they match, they will add the appropriate number
of points to the corresponding entries in the reputation matrix. Honest reporting for
the cases of online sellers and buyers proves to be a Nash Equilibrium [13]. In our
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model this is the case as well, at least for the honest users, and this suffices for our
algorithm to work.
Proposition 4.1 In the reporting game, truthful reporting is a strict Nash Equilib-
rium.
Under somewhat different conditions, Miller et al. [13] prove that honest reporting
is a strict Nash Equilibrium. In their model buyers gain points by rating sellers
under the control of a central authority (like in Amazon, eBay, etc). They consider
each rater’s signal as private information and if a rater believes that other raters
will announce their information truthfully, then transfers based on a strictly proper
scoring rule induce the rater to truthfully announce his/her own information. That
is, truthful reporting is a strict Nash Equilibrium.
In our case, we have a distributed authority which will evaluate the truthfulness
of the reports based on their counterparts. Reputations points from no matching
reports are not counted and will put the reporting peers in the list of suspicious
peers. Furthermore, honest nodes are risk neutral and seek to maximize their
reputation points. Thus the best bet for honest peers is truthful reporting. The
reports from the nodes are independent and identically distributed in a local area.
Let Si denote the report received by node i. And S = {s1, . . . , sM} be the set of
possible reports. Let sim denote the event S
i = sm. Let a = (a
1, . . . , aI) denote a
vector of announcements, one by each node, and ai ∈ S. Let aim ∈ S denote node i’s
announcement when its signal is sm. Let τi(a) denote he reputation points earned
by node i when its broadcasting peer (reporting pair) makes the announcement a.
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And let g(sj|si) represent Pr(Sj = sj |Si = si).
The proposition can be proved analogously to the one of Miller et al. [13]. What
follows is basically the same as their proof. For each peer, choose another peer r(i),
the playing peer for i, whose report i will be asked to match. Let
τi
(
ai, ar(i)
)
= R
(
ar(i)|ai
)
, (1)
where aim is the announcement of rater i when the rater signal is sm, and a
i = (aim)m
and R
(
ar(i)|ai
)
is a strictly proper scoring rule [8].
Assume that peer r(i) reports honestly: ar(i)(sm) = sm for all m. Since S
i
(the random signal received by i) is stochastically relevant for Sr(i), and r(i) reports
honestly, Si is also stochastically relevant for r(i)’s report as well.
Given that Si = s∗, player i chooses ai ∈ S in order to maximize:
M∑
n=1
R
(
sr(i)n |a
i
)
g
(
sr(i)n |s
∗
)
(2)
Since R(·|·) is a strictly proper scoring rule, (2) is uniquely maximized by announcing
ai = s∗, i.e., truthful announcement is a strict best response. Thus, given that player
r(i) announces truthfully, player i’s best response is to announce truthfully as well.

4.4 Matrices Built
From the information provided by the broadcast reports and the time slots (see
section 4.5), every node is able to fill up three N × N matrices on the fly, where N
is the total number of nodes participating. Next are described those matrices.
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4.4.1 Reputation Matrix
The reputation matrix serves to keep track of all the points earned by every node from
every interaction. Here we add up the points earned by node i from node j in the row
i, column j of this matrix. The method to fill this matrix is shown in Algorithm 1. As
an example we use Table 2, which shows five consecutive time buckets, in each of them
four pairs of nodes that interact and the reputation points earned as the outcome
of such interaction. In Table 3 we have the example of filling out the reputation
matrix after the first time bucket. The Table 4 shows the data in the reputation
matrix after the fifth time bucket. From the lines 3 to 13 in Algorithm 1, the nodes
check the reports received from the broadcast of the interacting nodes. Since the
reports are sent independently by every node, and several or many pairs of nodes
might be broadcasting simultaneously, the listeners need to look for matching pairs
of reports. The qj represents the contents of the queue at location j. The contents
in the queue are the reports received. The loop is always looking for matching
reports. In Section 4.5 we explain about the contents in the reports. The matching
is known by the hexadecimal key that is identical for both reports coming from the
same interacting pair. Once the node have a matching pair of reports, from the
information from them, it can put the corresponding values in every of the three
matrices.
4.4.2 Counter Matrix
The counter matrix, as its name suggests, is used to count the nodes appearing in
every time bucket. Through the data in this matrix, we can learn how many times a
node has interacted in total, and how many times it has interacted with any other
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Algorithm 1: Building the Reputation Matrix
Require: Broadcasted Reports, N ;
Ensure: Reputation Matrix {R};
1: i⇐ 0
2: j ⇐ 1
3: while Queue 6= ∅ do
4: if qj mismatch qi then
5: j ⇐ j + 1
6: if qj == ∅ and i 6= j − 1 then
7: i⇐ i+ 1
8: j ⇐ i+ 1
9: end if
10: if qj == ∅ and i == j − 1 then
11: i⇐ 0
12: j ⇐ 1
13: end if
14: else
15: From the reports:
16: a⇐ index of first node
17: b⇐ index of second node
18: Pqi ⇐ points for the first node
19: Pqj ⇐ points for the second node
20: Rab ⇐ Rab + Pqi
21: Rba ⇐ Rba + Pqj
22: qi ⇐ ∅
23: qj ⇐ ∅
24: Shift queue elements
25: end if
26: end while
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Time bucket Nodes interacting Points earned respectively
1 (η15, η9), (η7, η2), (η10, η12), (η11, η4) {-9,-15},{103,45},{42,34},{15,-26}
2 (η7, η8), (η15, η2), (η12, η10), (η3, η1) {114,114},{37,113},{94,84},{-7,-17}
3 (η6, η2), (η12, η7), (η11, η8), (η3, η1) {28,-40},{-36,36},{4,118},{-20,96}
4 (η1, η10), (η7, η5), (η12, η4), (η3, η11) {59,-12},{60,-10},{89,-34},{101,119}
5 (η2, η10), (η15, η14), (η1, η12), (η8, η6) {-15,6},{-22,67},{110,44},{41,45}
TABLE 2. Time buckets for the reputation matrix example
η1 η2 η3 η4 η5 η6 η7 η8 η9 η10 η11 η12 η13 η14 η15
η1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
η2 0 0 0 0 0 0 45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
η3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
η4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -26 0 0 0 0
η5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
η6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
η7 0 103 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
η8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
η9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -15
η10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 42 0 0 0
η11 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
η12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 34 0 0 0 0 0
η13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
η14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
η15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -9 0 0 0 0 0 0
TABLE 3. The reputation matrix after the first time bucket from table 2
specific node. This matrix is filled up in increments of one for every node that
appears in a time bucket. Suppose we have the next vector of pairs of nodes reporting
in the same time bucket, for example {(n3, n7), (n21, n77), (n53, n27), (n33, n10)}. Then
in the matrix, for the first pair of reporting nodes, all the values in columns 3 and
7 are incremented by one, except for the intersections with row 3 and row 7. Ditto
for the other three pairs of reporting nodes. The method for building the counter
matrix is shown in Algorithm 2.
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Algorithm 2: Building the Counter Matrix
Require: Broadcasted Reports, N ;
Ensure: Counter Matrix {C };
1: i⇐ 0
2: j ⇐ 1
3: while Queue 6= ∅ do
4: if qj mismatch qi then
5: j ⇐ j + 1
6: if qj == ∅ and i 6= j − 1 then
7: i⇐ i+ 1
8: j ⇐ i+ 1
9: end if
10: if qj == ∅ and i == j − 1 then
11: i⇐ 0
12: j ⇐ 1
13: end if
14: else
15: From the reports:
16: a⇐ index of first node
17: b⇐ index of second node
18: for l := 1 to N do
19: if l 6= a and l 6= b then
20: Cla ⇐ Cla + 1
21: Clb ⇐ Clb + 1
22: end if
23: end for
24: qi ⇐ ∅
25: qj ⇐ ∅
26: Shift queue elements
27: end if
28: end while
31
η1 η2 η3 η4 η5 η6 η7 η8 η9 η10 η11 η12 η13 η14 η15
η1 0 0 79 0 0 0 0 0 0 59 0 110 0 0 0
η2 0 0 0 0 0 -40 45 0 0 -15 0 0 0 0 113
η3 -27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 101 0 0 0 0
η4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -26 -34 0 0 0
η5 0 0 0 0 0 0 -10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
η6 0 28 0 0 0 0 0 45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
η7 0 103 0 0 60 0 0 114 0 0 0 36 0 0 0
η8 0 0 0 0 0 41 114 0 0 0 118 0 0 0 0
η9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -15
η10 -12 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 126 0 0 0
η11 0 0 119 15 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
η12 44 0 0 89 0 0 -36 0 0 128 0 0 0 0 0
η13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
η14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 67
η15 0 37 0 0 0 0 0 0 -9 0 0 0 0 -22 0
TABLE 4. The reputation matrix after the fifth time bucket from table 2
The values in Table 5 are used in the example of the filling of the counter matrix.
In Table 6 we see the data in the counter matrix after the first time bucket. The values
after the fifth time bucket for this same matrix are shown in Table 7. The counter
matrix, along with the reputation matrix, is used to find the affinity between nodes
through equation (3). After we have the affinity values we can run Tarjan’s algorithm
[19] on the graph to detect the Strongly Connected Components. More about this in
Section 4.6.
Time bucket Nodes interacting
1 (η8, η2), (η10, η1), (η9, η5), (η14, η7)
2 (η6, η5), (η10, η8), (η13, η3), (η15, η1)
3 (η8, η12), (η9, η6), (η11, η14), (η5, η2)
4 (η8, η2), (η6, η13), (η14, η4), (η11, η1)
5 (η13, η10), (η11, η7), (η12, η4), (η3, η2)
TABLE 5. Time buckets for the counter matrix example
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η1 η2 η3 η4 η5 η6 η7 η8 η9 η10 η11 η12 η13 η14 η15
η1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
η2 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
η3 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
η4 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
η5 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
η6 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
η7 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
η8 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
η9 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
η10 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
η11 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
η12 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
η13 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
η14 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
η15 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
TABLE 6. The counter matrix after the first time bucket from table 5
4.4.3 Inbucket Matrix
Last but not least we have the inbucket matrix, which serves to detect which nodes
never (or seldom) appear in the same time bucket in different reporting pairs. For
the same vector of pairs of nodes {(n3, n7), (n21, n77), (n53, n27), (n33, n10)}, in this
case here the matrix is filled out in a similar way as the counter matrix, but now
incrementing the values only in the rows corresponding to the nodes in the vector,
except for the rows of the reporting pair. For example, the values in columns 3
and 7 of this matrix are incremented by one only in rows 21, 77, 53, 27, 33 and
10. Columns 21 and 77 are incremented by one only in rows 3, 7, 53, 27, 33 and
10. The same goes for the other pairs of reporting nodes. The resulting matrix
is symmetric. The method to fill out the inbucket matrix is explained in Algorithm 3.
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Algorithm 3: Building the Inbucket Matrix
Require: Broadcasted Reports, N ;
Ensure: Inbucket Matrix {B };
1: i⇐ 0
2: j ⇐ 1
3: while Queue 6= ∅ do
4: if qj mismatch qi then
5: j ⇐ j + 1
6: if qj == ∅ and i 6= j − 1 then
7: i⇐ i+ 1
8: j ⇐ i+ 1
9: end if
10: if qj == ∅ and i == j − 1 then
11: i⇐ 0
12: j ⇐ 1
13: end if
14: else
15: From the reports:
16: a⇐ index of first node
17: b⇐ index of second node
18: r ⇐ tag of this inbucket
19: for l := 1 to N do
20: if l 6= a and l 6= b then
21: if l equals to any element index within the time bucket r then
22: Bla ⇐ Bla + 1
23: Blb ⇐ Blb + 1
24: end if
25: end if
26: end for
27: qi ⇐ ∅
28: qj ⇐ ∅
29: Shift queue elements
30: end if
31: end while
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η1 η2 η3 η4 η5 η6 η7 η8 η9 η10 η11 η12 η13 η14 η15
η1 0 4 2 2 3 3 2 4 2 2 2 2 3 3 0
η2 3 0 1 2 2 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 3 3 1
η3 3 3 0 2 3 3 2 4 2 3 3 2 2 3 1
η4 3 4 2 0 3 3 2 4 2 3 3 1 3 2 1
η5 3 3 2 2 0 2 2 4 1 3 3 2 3 3 1
η6 3 4 2 2 2 0 2 4 1 3 3 2 2 3 1
η7 3 4 2 2 3 3 0 4 2 3 2 2 3 2 1
η8 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 0 2 2 3 1 3 3 1
η9 3 4 2 2 2 2 2 4 0 3 3 2 3 3 1
η10 2 4 2 2 3 3 2 3 2 0 3 2 2 3 1
η11 2 4 2 2 3 3 1 4 2 3 0 2 3 2 1
η12 3 4 2 1 3 3 2 3 2 3 3 0 3 3 1
η13 3 4 1 2 3 2 2 4 2 2 3 2 0 3 1
η14 3 4 2 1 3 3 1 4 2 3 2 2 3 0 1
η15 2 4 2 2 3 3 2 4 2 3 3 2 3 3 0
TABLE 7. The counter matrix after the fifth time bucket from table 5
We use the data in Table 8 as an example of building the inbucket matrix.
Table 9 shows the data in the inbucket matrix after the first time bucket. The data
in Table 10 represents the inbucket matrix after the fifth time bucket. Using the
information in this matrix, we can find Densest Subgraphs by running Charikar’s
algorithm [7]. More on this in Section 4.7. A more detailed example about the
inbucket matrix is in Section 4.5).
Time bucket Nodes interacting
1 (η5, η9), (η15, η12), (η7, η13), (η6, η8)
2 (η13, η10), (η3, η15), (η9, η2), (η5, η4)
3 (η5, η15), (η10, η12), (η6, η4), (η11, η13)
4 (η2, η10), (η15, η13), (η1, η8), (η7, η9)
5 (η3, η5), (η12, η14), (η6, η7), (η1, η10)
TABLE 8. Time buckets for the Inbucket Matrix example
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η1 η2 η3 η4 η5 η6 η7 η8 η9 η10 η11 η12 η13 η14 η15
η1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
η2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
η3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
η4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
η5 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
η6 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1
η7 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
η8 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1
η9 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
η10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
η11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
η12 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
η13 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
η14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
η15 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
TABLE 9. The inbucket matrix after the first time bucket from table 8
4.5 Report Broadcasting and the Time Buckets
Peers interact through an encrypted channel. Every pair of nodes interacting (ac-
cording to the rules in Section 4.3) must independently broadcast their reports just
after their interaction is over. A synchronized clock (e.g. Unix Time [17]) is used
to determine the time buckets. The reports that they broadcast contain the next
information:
 The ID of the node and the ID of its interacting peer.
 The reputation points earned by the node and by its interacting peer.
 10 character hexadecimal key generated randomly at the end of the interaction
(the same for both).
 The clock time taken when closing the interaction (the same for both).
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η1 η2 η3 η4 η5 η6 η7 η8 η9 η10 η11 η12 η13 η14 η15
η1 0 1 1 0 1 1 2 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
η2 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 2
η3 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 2 0 1 1 1 0
η4 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 1 1 2 0 2
η5 1 1 1 1 0 3 2 1 1 3 1 3 3 1 2
η6 1 0 1 0 3 0 1 0 1 2 1 3 2 1 2
η7 2 1 1 0 2 1 0 2 1 2 0 2 1 1 2
η8 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 2 1 0 1 2 0 2
η9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 0 2 0 1 3 0 3
η10 1 1 2 2 3 2 2 1 2 0 1 1 2 1 3
η11 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
η12 1 0 1 1 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 1
η13 1 2 1 2 3 2 1 2 3 2 0 2 0 0 3
η14 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
η15 1 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 1 1 3 0 0
TABLE 10. The inbucket matrix after the fifth time bucket from Table 8
The random key reported independently by the interacting pair of peers, as well as
the clock time, have to be exactly the same. The other information in the reports,
that is the IDs and the reputation points earned, must match. When the interaction
begins, after the handshake, each node has the ID of its participating partner.
Each node keeps track of the points earned by itself and the other, and at the end,
the node requesting the termination of the operation generates the ten-character
hexadecimal key, and the other node records the clock time. After that, the nodes
interchange the information in order to generate the matching reports and broadcast
them. Algorithm 4 describes these steps.
In order to keep track of all the independent nodes able to broadcast their
reports simultaneously (non Sybil), we monitor them through time buckets. Let us
explain this using Figure 1. Here, the black dots represent regular nodes and the red
37
Algorithm 4: Interaction and creation of reports for broadcast
Require: Two-way communication to a participating peer;
Ensure: A pair of matching reports for broadcast;
1: Handshake with the participating peer
2: IDpeer ⇐ ID of the interacting peer
3: IDmine ⇐ My ID
4: Finish Signal⇐ false
5: S⇐ 0
6: R⇐ 0
7: RKey⇐ 0
8: UT⇐ 0
9: MyReport⇐ ∅
10: while Finish Signal == false do
11: Interaction with the peer under the rules of Table 1
12: if want to finish then
13: Send: Finish Signal⇐true
14: S⇐ 1
15: else
16: if Finish Signal received then
17: Finish Signal⇐true
18: R⇐ 1
19: end if
20: end if
21: end while
22: if S == 1 then
23: RKey⇐ random 10 char hex
24: Send: Rkey
25: Receive: UT Unix Time
26: else
27: if R == 1 then
28: UT⇐ Unix Time
29: Send: UT
30: Receive: RKey
31: end if
32: end if
33: MyReport⇐{IDmine, IDpeer, RKey, UT}
34: Broadcast: MyReport
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circles represent the Sybil nodes. The links indicate interactions between two nodes.
In the case of Sybil nodes this is not necessarily a real interaction, since a malicious
user can just broadcast the two reports almost simultaneously, trying to make them
appear as independent nodes.
Fig. 1. A Sybil couple (η10 and η14) broadcasting reports along with pairs of regular nodes
within the same time bucket.
Imagine that all the interacting nodes of Figure 1 broadcast their reports within
the same time bucket or slot of time. Any node is able to read all the broadcast
reports from every time bucket, and keep a record on every node, not only of its
reputation points but also of which nodes broadcast their reports within the same
time bucket. As an example, assume that η3 represents node 3 from Figure 1, then
all the nodes will register that the nodes showing up simultaneously (in the same
time bucket) with η3 are η1, η6, η7, η8, η10, η11, η12, η14, η15, η16, η17, η19, η20, η21, η23 and
η24. As you can see η2, η4, η5, η9, η13, η18, η22, η25 and η26 are not in the registry.
The reason for omitting η5 is because it is the partner or interacting peer of η3.
The others are omitted just because they are not broadcasting any reports. It means
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that the nodes registered for η5 will be exactly the same nodes registered for η3.
This same method is applied to every broadcasting pair and all this is repeated in
each time bucket. With all the information provided in this way, every node can fill
out a matrix on the fly. Next, in Table 11 we show a matrix with the output values
corresponding to the interactions and broadcasts shown in the example of Figure 1.
As can be seen, nodes η1 and η7 are not counted, either in the first or the
seventh row since they are a broadcasting pair in that time bucket. Nodes that are
not broadcasting are obviously out of the count. The matrix shown in Table 11 is
the output after the first time bucket, subsequently using the same procedure and
according to the new broadcasting pairs in the next time bucket, the corresponding
values are incremented by one, and so on. We call this matrix inbucket matrix (see
section 4.4).
The point here is that the Sybil nodes, since they are under the control of a
malicious user, are more limited in the ability to show up together [10] than the
independent nodes. After taking information from enough time buckets the matrix
will show which nodes never (or seldom) appear broadcasting within the same time
bucket. The graph drawn out of this matrix is an undirected one, and the Sybil
nodes here tend to form a clique. With enough information in this matrix, every
listener node is able to look for Densest Subgraphs by the algorithm of Charikar [7],
which indicate Sybil behavior. Once a set of nodes is detected by this algorithm,
those nodes have to be removed from the graph, in order to run again the algorithm
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η1 η2 η3 η4 η5 η6 η7 η8 η9 η10 η11 η12 η13 η14 η15 η16 η17 η18 η19 η20 η21 η22 η23 η24 η25 η26
η1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
η2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
η3 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
η4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
η5 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
η6 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
η7 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
η8 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
η9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
η10 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
η11 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
η12 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
η13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
η14 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
η15 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
η16 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
η17 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
η18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
η19 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
η20 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
η21 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
η22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
η23 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
η24 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
η25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
η26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TABLE 11. Inbucket Matrix after the first time bucket
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TABLE 12. Nonlinear Model Results
Case Method#1 Method#2 Method#3
1 50 837 970
2 47 877 230
3 31 25 415
4 35 144 2356
5 45 300 556
looking for another densest subgraph, and so on, until nothing is found. The Sybil
groups will be then exposed in the densest subgraphs detected. However, we still do
not formally consider them Sybil. We tag all the nodes in the densest subgraph as
highly suspicious of being Sybil. The next step in confirming this is the testing phase
as described in Section 4.8.
4.6 Finding the Strongly Connected Components
Here we need the information from the reputation and counter matrices in order to
find the strongly connected components. The reputation points earned by node A
from node B are not necessarily the same quantity that the points earned by node B
from node A. That is why we get strongly connected components. This is explained
in Section 4.3 and an example is given in Tables 3 and 4. Here we use a similar
concept of affinity as the one given by Piro et al. [16], they also declared a formula to
set a value for that matter. In our case we define the affinity between nodes based on
the reputation points earned and on the number of interactions. Here we create our
own formula to set the value of affinity based on the specific characteristics of our
algorithm. We use the following expression to define the affinity between two nodes:
Aij =
Pij
Ψi
+
Iij
ιi
(3)
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Here Aij is defined to be the affinity of node i for node j. We use Pij to represent
the total of points earned by node i from the interaction with node j, and Ψi is the
total of points earned by node i in its lifetime. The value of Iij is the number of
interactions between the nodes i and j, and ιi is the total number of interactions
performed by the node i in its lifetime. Obviously, the values for Aij are rational
and in the range from 0 to 2. All the other variables have integer values. Given the
reputation matrix we can read the value of Pij directly from the intersection of row i
and column j. The value of Ψi is obtained from this same matrix by adding all the
reputation points in the respective row. We have then:
Ψi =
n−1∑
j=0
Pij ,
where n is the total number of nodes participating and being screened. The values of
Iij and ιi are taken from the counter matrix. The value of ιi is equal to the summation
of all the values in column i divided by n− 2, that is,
ιi =
∑n−1
j=0 Cji
n− 2
,
where Cji represents the value in row j and column i of the counter matrix. The
value Iij is just the difference between ιi and Cij.
Iij = ιi − Cij
Once we have all the required values we can use equation (3) to find Aij . We set
here a threshold value or lower cap σ. The value for σ will depend on the circum-
stances. The value of affinity between nodes can go from zero to two. Depending
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on the size of the network and its activity, the affinity links between honest nodes
can have, in average, different values. If a malicious user cheat to boost the reputa-
tion points of his/her Sybil nodes, those nodes will appear with affinity links values
higher than the average for honest nodes. Then we need a value of σ just above the
average to detect the group(s) of Sybil nodes by the strongly connected components.
If Aij > σ, we say that node i is strongly connected to node j. Then we can apply
Tarjan’s algorithm [19] to find the Strongly Connected Components. The pseudocode
for this is shown in Algorithm 5.
Observation 4.2 When peers from a group of nodes earn too many reputation points
between them, that group can be detected through the Strongly Connected Components
method.
Indeed, the reputation points earned between nodes are asymmetric. According
to our Equation (3) for affinity, the more reputation points a node earns from a peer,
the higher its affinity for it. There is a threshold beyond which we consider that one
node is connected to another. If the reputation a group of nodes earn between them
exceeds the threshold, all of them will form a Strongly Connected Component.
4.7 Finding Densest Subgraphs
For this we use the inbucket matrix as explained in Sections 4.4 and 4.5. We can
find relations among nodes based on the timing of their broadcasts. A group of Sybil
nodes under the control of a malicious user will be limited in their capacity to showing
up simultaneously. After we have enough information in the inbucket matrix, we will
be able to find connections among the nodes that will form evidence that they belong
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Algorithm 5: Detecting the Sybil groups by Strongly Connected Components
Require: Reputation Matrix, Counter Matrix, N , σ;
Ensure: SCC {Strongly Connected Components (Sybil groups)};
1: for i := 0 to N − 1 do
2: for j := 0 to N − 1 do
3: Ψi ⇐ Ψi + Pij
4: end for
5: end for
6: for j := 0 to N − 1 do
7: for i := 0 to N − 1 do
8: ιi ⇐ ιi + δij
9: end for
10: end for
11: for i := 0 to N − 1 do
12: ιi ⇐
ιi
N−2
13: end for
14: for i := 0 to N − 1 do
15: for j := 0 to N − 1 do
16: Iij ⇐ ιi − δij
17: end for
18: end for
19: for i := 0 to N − 1 do
20: for j := 0 to N − 1 do
21: Aij ⇐
Pij
Ψi
+
Iij
ιi
22: end for
23: end for
24: for i := 0 to N − 1 do
25: for j := 0 to N − 1 do
26: if Aij > σ then
27: dedgeij ⇐ True
28: end if
29: end for
30: end for
31: Apply Tarjan’s algorithm on the graph;
32: SCC ⇐ results from Tarjan’s algorithm;
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to a Sybil group. The quantity of samples or time buckets that we need depends on
the percentage of Sybil nodes in the network.
Observation 4.3 When peers from a group of nodes never (or seldom) appear broad-
casting within the same time bucket, then that group of nodes can be detected as a
dense subgraph.
Without loss of generality suppose that we have n nodes and that all of them broad-
cast randomly with the same probability; and that at every time bucket ⌈ n
10
⌉ nodes
broadcast. After τ samples we will see that the appearance of the nodes show a
uniform distribution; where τ is the minimum number of samples needed to detect
that the distribution is uniform. The value of τ can be predicted by the analysis of
historical data. A group of Sybil nodes is limited in showing up together: the larger
the group the more the limitation. The distribution of Sybil nodes appearances will
thus not be uniform with respect to the other nodes.
Observation 4.4 The more the Sybil nodes, the sooner they can be detected as a
Densest Subgraph by the data collected from the time buckets.
The bigger the group of Sybil nodes, the harder it is for a malicious user to make
them appear as independent entities, and the fewer time buckets are needed to
discover the connections among them. In other words, the nonuniform distribution
of the Sybil nodes with respect to the others will be accentuated and noticeable
from fewer samples.
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We can build an undirected graph from the information we have in the inbucket
matrix. A Sybil group will have few or no links among its Sybil nodes. We need to
invert this situation in order to spot the Sybil groups through the Densest Subgraph
method. For that purpose we set M as the maximum number of edges between any
two nodes in the graph, and εij as the number of edges between nodes ai and aj . The
value εij is taken directly from the inbucket matrix. Then,
eij = M − εij , ∀ i 6= j , (4)
where eij is the new number of edges between nodes ai and aj . So, we can now spot
the Sybil groups in a polynomial time using linear programming as in the Densest
Subgraph algorithm of Charikar [7]. Dense Subgraphs represent the groups of nodes
we are looking for, the Sybil ones. The pseudocode for this is shown in Algorithm 6.
As you can notice, there is a tradeoff. The more the Sybil nodes in a group, the
sooner they can be detected as a Densest Subgraph; but the harder it might be to
detect them as a Strongly Connected Component, and viceversa. More about this is
explained in Chapter 5.
4.8 Tests on Suspicious Nodes
It is necessary to run some tests on all those nodes detected through Algorithms 5 and
6, in order to reduce false positives. To do this, we choose some nodes among those
with the highest reputation not in a Strongly Connected Component or a Densest
Subgraph (SCC∪DS) group, i.e. not suspected Sybilness, to form a group of testers.
We refer to the size of the tester group as ̺. This value depends on the number
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Algorithm 6: Detecting the Sybil groups by Densest Subgraphs
Require: Inbucket Matrix, N ;
Ensure: DS {Densest Subgraphs (Sybil groups)};
1: M ⇐ 0
2: for i := 0 to N − 1 do
3: for j := 0 to i do
4: if εij > M then
5: M ⇐ εij
6: end if
7: end for
8: end for
9: for i := 0 to N − 1 do
10: for j := 0 to N − 1 do
11: if i 6= j then
12: eij ⇐M − εij
13: end if
14: end for
15: end for
16: Apply Charikar’s algorithm on the new graph;
17: DS ⇐ results from Charikar’s algorithm;
of elements in SCC ∪DS and the redundancy we might need. Those chosen nodes
now coordinate the testing of their suspected peers. The one with the lowest index
broadcasts the first test to all the suspected nodes and it waits for their replies within
a time frame. Then that tester node sends a ready signal to the next tester. After
that, the second tester node starts the testing phase and goes through the same
method; and so on. Then from most of the fail matches on the test reports, we have
the Sybil nodes. The pseudocode for the complete method is listed in Algorithm 8.
and we describe it in more detail in Section 4.9.
4.9 The Algorithm to detect the Sybil nodes
The authority nodes must always be listening for reports and waiting for the signal
to proceed on the search of Sybil nodes, that is represented in the first ten lines of
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Algorithm 7: Testing the nodes to corroborate the Sybilness
Require: suspected nodes, reputation list by rank;
Ensure: SN {Sybil nodes};
1: total suspected ⇐ total of suspected nodes
2: testers,r ⇐ ⌈total suspected/10⌉
3: a,b,i⇐0
4: while a < r do
5: while i < total suspected do
6: if reputation rank[a] == suspicious[i] then
7: r=r+1
8: break
9: else
10: if i == total suspected-1 then
11: testers[b] = reputation rank[a]
12: b=b+1
13: end if
14: end if
15: i=i+1
16: end while
17: a=a+1
18: end while
19: for i:=0 to testers do
20: if MyID == testers[i] then
21: testvector[from j:=0 to size]⇐ random numbers
22: k ⇐10i+1
23: Broadcast testvector to {suspiciousk , suspiciousk+1, . . ., suspiciousk+9}
24: Wait for the sortedvector from the suspicious nodes
25: Verify the promptness of the reply
26: Report results
27: Break
28: else
29: if MyID == suspicious[i] then
30: k = ⌊i/10⌋
31: Receive the testvector from testers[k]
32: sortedvector ⇐ Apply Quicksort to testvector
33: Send sortedvector to tester[k]
34: Break
35: end if
36: end if
37: end for
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the pseudocode of Algorithm 8. Every time they receive reports, they fill out their
matrices through the Algorithms 1, 2 and 3. Once there is enough information in
the matrices, this is after several hundreds time buckets, any node can broadcast a
signal requesting to proceed on the search of Sybil nodes. Then the authority nodes
(all the nodes can be authority nodes at the same time) run the Algorithms 5 and 6
looking for Strongly Connected Components and Densest Subgraphs, then from the
total of suspected nodes found, we determine the total of tester nodes needed, which
is about 10% of the total of suspected nodes found plus two (line 14), adding two is
just for redundancy to avoid having only one tester in the cases of low number of
suspected nodes.
Then we can proceed with the selection of the tester nodes (from line 15 to
17), they are chosen among those nodes with higher reputation and not in group of
suspected. There is a minimum value of reputation required to be a tester node,
this value is γ and it is set from the median of reputation points. Once the tester
nodes are defined, they proceed with the testing of the suspected nodes (lines 18
to 27). The first tester broadcast the test to the suspected nodes and waits for the
replies. The suspected nodes must reply within a time range of at most 3
2
τ where τ
is the mean or average time required for the reply.
Those nodes that reply out of the allowed range are marked by that tester node
and then it broadcast the results to all the tester nodes and sends a ready signal to
the next tester node, which execute the same commands, and so on for all the tester
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nodes. A more detailed pseudocode about the testing is given in Algorithm 7 and it
has a variant, the tester nodes work simultaneously (in parallel) testing the suspected
nodes by blocks of one tenth. This is to speed up the testing process in case we have
a high number of suspected nodes. The last steps are for the sum of the results from
all the testers (lines 29 to 38), if a suspected node failed in three quarters of the tests
or more, then it is considered a Sybil node.
4.10 The Running Time
In our method explained here in chapter 4, we use the greedy approximation
algorithm of Charikar [7] for finding dense components in a graph. In the case of this
algorithm, it has a complexity of O(m+ n log n), where m represents the number of
edges and n represents the number of vertices or nodes.
We also use the Tarjan’s algorithm [19], in this case to find the Strongly Con-
nected Components; The complexity for this other algorithm is O(m+ n). So, it is
easy to see that the total running time for our algorithm described in this chapter is
bounded to O(m+ n log n).
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Algorithm 8: The complete process of detecting the Sybil nodes
Require: Reputation Matrix, Counter Matrix, Inbucket Matrix, N , γ, σ, τ ;
Ensure: SN {Sybil nodes};
1: while true do
2: Listen for reports
3: if reports received then
4: Call algorithms 1, 2 and 3
5: end if
6: Listen for Sybil search signal
7: if Sybil search signal received then
8: Continue from line 11
9: end if
10: end while
11: Call algorithm 5 (Input:Reputation Matrix, Counter Matrix, N , σ;
Returns: SCC;)
12: Call algorithm 6 (Input:Inbucket Matrix, N ; Returns: DS;)
13: x⇐ |SCC ∪DS|
14: z ⇐ ⌈ x
10
⌉+ 2
15: for i := 0 to z − 1 do
16: Select testeri
Where: testeri /∈ {SCC,DS} and testeri reputation > γ ;
17: end for
18: for i := 0 to z − 1 do
19: testeri broadcast the test to the {SCC ∪DS} nodes;
20: while time > 2τ do
21: testeri listen
22: if nodexj does not reply within
3
2
τ then
23: Kixj ⇐ 1
24: end if
25: end while
26: Broadcast of the results to all the testers
27: Ready signal for testeri+1
28: end for
29: for j := 0 to x− 1 do
30: y ⇐ 0
31: for i := 0 to z − 1 do
32: y ⇐ y +Kixj
33: end for
34: if y > 3
4
z then
35: nodexj ∈ SN
36: end if
37: end for
38: Return SN
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CHAPTER 5
SIMULATION RESULTS
A network environment was modeled with different percentages of Sybil nodes under
the control of malicious user. Those Sybil nodes pretend to interact among them in
order to build false reputations, claiming to be independent and trustworthy nodes,
which is the foundation for the Sybil attack. We show next the outcomes of the
simulations after thousands of experiments.
5.1 Detection by Strongly Connected Components
The point at coordinates (1800,50) of Figure 2 shows that in a network with 10% of
Sybil nodes and after one thousand eight hundred time buckets of information, in one
hundred experiments, fifty showed at least one or more of the honest nodes strongly
connected with another, without being part of the Strongly Connected Components.
Fig. 2. Detection results by the Strongly Connected Components method for every one
hundred experiments with 5% and 10% of Sybil nodes respectively.
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In the results of the experiments showed at Figures 2 and 4, at every time
bucket, there were always ten percent of the total of nodes (honests plus Sybils)
interacting and broadcasting. Those nodes were chosen randomly every time. In
Figures 2 and 4 we see that the less the percentage of Sybil nodes, the sooner
they can be detected as a Strongly Connected Component, this supposing that the
malicious user is using all his/her Sybil nodes to earn reputation points between
them, in order to make them appear trustworthy. This is because the more the
Sybil nodes, the less the reputation points needed from every Sybil peer to total
the minimum required to be considered trustworthy. In other words, the more
the Sybil nodes, the reputation points earned between them can be more diffused
and consequently their Sybil connections appear weaker. For that reason, different
values of σ (the threshold value described in Section 4.6) has to be tried to detect
the Sybil nodes as a Strongly Connected Component. There is a tradeoff here, if the
value of σ is too low, many honest nodes might appear “strongly connected” but not
necessarily forming a group; on the other hand if the value of σ is high, it is easier
for a malicious user to evade this detection, following is an illustrative example for
this case.
The Sybil nodes could be so many and their reputation points and interactions so
widely dispersed that they could avoid appearing as a Strongly Connected Component.
This is not an easy task, in a group of n Sybil nodes, it would take at least Ω(n)
operations for a Sybil node to simulate an interaction with every other Sybil peer
(see figure 3). So, it would take at least Ω(n2) operations in total for all the Sybil
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Fig. 3. Sybil nodes simulating an interaction with their Sybil peer a, in order to boost
their reputation points.
nodes to interact with all their Sybil peers. If every Sybil interaction is reported with
about the same amount of reputation points, then the affinity of one node with any
other node would be ≈ 2
n
and this value just need to be under the lower threshold
(or value of σ described in Section 4.6) to avoid this specific detection method. All
that is nothing straightforward for a malicious user who needs big values of n and the
costly Ω(n2) interactions in order to give high reputation to all his/her Sybil nodes
without making them appear as a Strongly Connected Component.
Although, a malicious user can concentrate the effort in giving high reputation
to few or only to one of his/her Sybil nodes, in that case he/she would require only
Θ(n) interactions but still a big value of n. On the other hand, the more the Sybil
nodes created by a malicious user, the more those nodes will be exposed by the
other detection method (see Sections 4.7 and 5.2) and appear as a Densest Subgraph
by the timing of their broadcasts.
In Figure 5 are shown the results for the detection by the Strongly Connected
Component method for the cases of 5% and 10% of Sybil nodes in the network. The
point at coordinates (1000,18.53) means that for the case of a network with 10%
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Fig. 4. Detection results through the Strongly Connected Components method for every
one hundred experiments with 15% and 20% of Sybil nodes respectively.
of Sybil nodes, after one thousand time buckets, there are in average 18.53 honest
nodes appearing strongly connected to others and not necessarily interconnected
forming a group, which is in most of the cases. Similar results are shown in
Figure 6, the difference is that the more the Sybil nodes the more the time buckets
of observation needed to find the proper relations. The results shown in Figures 5
and 6 corresponds to an activity, at every time bucket, of 10% of the total of the nodes.
The results shown in Figure 7 represent the outcome of the experiments
with an activity, at every time bucket, of 20% of the total of the nodes. Since
there is more participation, the relationships among the nodes can be detected sooner.
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Fig. 5. Detection results by the Strongly Connected Components method in the cases of
5% and 10% of Sybil nodes situation. The “x” axis represents the time buckets.
5.2 Detection by Densest Subgraphs
The Sybil nodes can also gain all their reputation points honestly and they will
not appear as a Strongly Connected Component, avoiding this way just one of our
detection methods. In this case our algorithm prevents the nodes from cheating on
the reputation points.
In Figure 8 are shown the results of some experiments. As can be seen, the fewer
the Sybil nodes, the more the time buckets (or information in the inbucket matrix)
that is needed to detect the Densest Subgraphs. In Figure 8, the point at coordinates
(1400,53) means that in one hundred experiments in a network with 10% of Sybil
nodes and using only one thousand and four hundred time buckets, fifty three of the
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Fig. 6. Detection results by the Strongly Connected Components method in the cases of
15% and 20% of Sybil nodes situation. The “x” axis represents the time buckets.
experiments had at least one honest node connected to another and not necessarily
as part of a Densest Subgraph. As more information is in the inbucket matrix, the
number of those honest nodes connected to others tend to be zero. For this method,
it is easier to detect a group of Sybil nodes in a network with a high percentage of
them. Since they are limited in their capacity of broadcasting together, the bigger
the group, the more they are exposed and fewer the time buckets required to spot
them.
The results shown in Figure 9 represent how many honest nodes are connected
with others. In Table 13 is shown a tiny example just as an illustration of this.
Supposing that the nodes labeled from zero to four are Sybil, they form a clique
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Fig. 7. Detection results by the Strongly Connected Components method in the cases of
10%, 15% and 20% of Sybil nodes situation. The “x” axis represents the time buckets.
that can be detected as a Densest Subgraph; while there are other connections, those
are loose, i.e. they do not form a group that would appear as a Densest Subgraph.
Returning to the Figure 9, the coordinates (1000,31.5) means that in an environment
with 5% of Sybil nodes, after one thousand of time buckets, there are in average 31.5
honest nodes that are connected with others.
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Fig. 8. Detection results by the Densest Subgraph method in the presence of different
percentages of Sybil nodes.
Fig. 9. Detection results by the Densest Subgraph method in the cases of 5%, 10%, 15%
and 20% of Sybil nodes environment. The “x” axis represents the time buckets.
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η0 → η1, η2, η3, η4.
η1 → η0, η2, η3, η4.
η2 → η0, η1, η3, η4.
η3 → η0, η1, η2, η4.
η4 → η0, η1, η2, η3.
η8 → η52
η21 → η83
η27 → η78, η84.
TABLE 13. Example of connections among nodes.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE WORK
Our algorithm works well in local area networks, but communication and timing
problems arise as the network size increases. The basic solution for this case would be
to divide big networks into smaller ones and create clusters of observers or distributed
authority groups that would interchange their information. However, new issues and
coordination problems appear when a node of one group interacts with a node of
another group. Either we can create a distributed authority group only for those
cases (if there are few of them), or just ignore those interactions. In this last case it
would be easier for a malicious user to hide his/her Sybil nodes among the different
groups, and to some extent, avoid detection by the Strongly Connected Components
and Densest Subgraph algorithms, as explained in Sections 4.6 and 4.7 respectively.
For that case this is still an open problem, as is the case of several colluding malicious
users that can operate several Sybil nodes simultaneously in order to make them
appear as trustworthy independent ones.
6.1 Conclusions
We showed a novel system to detect Sybil nodes and prevent Sybil attack. We
combine some ingredients from earlier work, but as far as we know, this is the first
approach that addresses both the static and the dynamic networks. We use here a
distributed authority to keep track of the nodes’ behavior and reputation, and detect
the Sybil nodes through Strongly Connected Components and/or Densest Subgraphs.
After that, tests are run on the suspected nodes in order to eliminate any false
positives. Our algorithm is effective even in the presence of a high percentage of
Sybil nodes in the system. The algorithm is easy to implement and requires not
62
high memory resources, the total running time for it is bounded to O(m + n logn)
as explained in 4.10.
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